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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—All Mixed Up and Don’t Know What To Do: A Review
of the Tenth Circuit’s Approach to Sentencing in Federal Methamphetamine
Production Cases; United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1996)
(en banc)
Kevin L. Daniels*

INTRODUCTION
Methamphetamine, the substance at issue in United States v. Richards, is a
burgeoning epidemic in the states that comprise the Tenth Circuit, including
Wyoming.1 The National Institute of Drug Abuse describes methamphetamine
as a “powerfully addictive stimulant that dramatically affects the central nervous
system.”2
The issue presented in Richards—whether it is proper to include the by-product
of methamphetamine production when determining the drug quantity for
sentencing purposes—is still relevant today.3 The present circuit split—centered
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank my wife Trisha
and my son Porter for their love and support throughout the course of this project. Special thanks
to Dean Stephen Easton and Lisa Rich for their assistance with this note.
1
87 F.3d 1152, 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2008
Dataﬁle, at 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2008/10c08.pdf. According to statistics
compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission, in ﬁscal year 2008, twenty-two percent
of federally sentenced defendants in the states that comprise the Tenth Circuit committed drug
offenses. Id. Thirty-ﬁve percent of these involved methamphetamine. Id.; see also U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 2008 Dataﬁle, at 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2008/wy08.pdf.
In Wyoming, forty-seven percent of federally sentenced defendants committed drug offenses. Id.
Nearly seventy-ﬁve percent of these involved methamphetamine. Id.
2

National Institute on Drug Abuse, Methamphetamine (2008), at 1–2, available at http://
www.npaihb.org/images/epicenter_docs/Meth/RRMetham.pdf. According to the Institute:
[Methamphetamine] is a white, odorless, bitter tasting crystalline powder that
easily dissolves in water or alcohol. The drug was developed early last century
from its parent drug, amphetamine, and was originally used in bronchial inhalers.
Like amphetamine, methamphetamine causes increased activity and talkativeness,
decreased appetite, and a general sense of well-being. However, methamphetamine
differs from amphetamine in that at comparable doses, much higher levels of
methamphetamine get into the brain, making it a more potent stimulant drug.
It also has longer lasting and more harmful effects on the central nervous system.
Id.
3

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Clarke v. United States, No. 09-455, 2009 WL
3341929 (Oct. 14, 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-455, 2009 WL 3344912 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009)
(asserting the need for the Court to resolve the existing circuit split); see Richards, 87 F.3d at
1152 (“Methamphetamine is commonly synthesized via a process that yields methamphetamine
in a liquid solution. Operators of clandestine methamphetamine labs attempt to extract the pure
methamphetamine from the liquid mixture.”).
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on interpretations of Chapman v. United States—indicates a continuing chasm
which must be resolved in order for uniformity and consistency in sentencing to
occur as we work through today’s epidemic.4
The Drug Enforcement Agency has noted the increase of methamphetamine
production in the United States.5 This increase in methamphetamine
production—combined with the lack of resolution surrounding the circuit
split—highlights the need to address the issue of whether it is proper to include
the by-product of methamphetamine production when determining the drug
quantity for sentencing purposes.6 Recently, the United States Supreme Court
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari centered on this issue.7 Despite the denial,
the petition for a writ of certiorari illustrates the sentencing issues surrounding
the production of methamphetamine are still prevalent today.8 Richards is the
controlling precedent in the Tenth Circuit for determining whether it is proper
to include by-products of methamphetamine production in determining drug
quantity for sentencing purposes.9
On August 10, 1990, law enforcement arrested Larry D. Richards for possession
of a liquid mixture containing detectible amounts of methamphetamine.10
Richards pleaded guilty to possession of 1,000 grams or more of a liquid mixture
containing a detectible amount of methamphetamine, with intent to manufacture
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.11 Based upon the entire weight
of the substance, Richards received a sentence of 188 months imprisonment.12
The district court later reduced Richards’s sentence to 60 months imprisonment.13
A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit afﬁrmed the sentence reduction and
held Richards responsible for only 28 grams of methamphetamine, not the 32

4
See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 453 (1991) (holding blotter paper and LSD
constitute a “mixture” under the plain meaning of the term because LSD crystals are diffused among
the ﬁbers of the blotter paper); infra note 97 and accompanying text.
5
U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Drug Threat Assessment (2009), available at http://www.
justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32166/overview.htm#Outlook (stating methamphetamine production will
likely increase).
6

Id.; see supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.

7

Clarke, 564 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-455, 2009 WL 3344912 (U.S.
Nov. 16, 2009).
8

Id. at 4–5.

9

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1152.

10

Id. at 1153.

11

Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .”).
12

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.

13

Id. at 1154.
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kilograms he was originally responsible for.14 The Tenth Circuit granted en banc
review in order to clarify whether the United States Sentencing Guidelines or the
statutory deﬁnition of mixture or substance controlled.15
This note will ﬁrst argue the United States Supreme Court’s precedent in
Chapman, in deﬁning the phrase “mixture or substance” as contained in § 841(b),
is the only way to satisfy congressional intent with respect to methamphetamine
drug trafﬁcking.16 This analysis will reinforce the importance of giving statutes
their plain and ordinary meaning when Congress does not provide a statutory
deﬁnition.17 Second, this note will argue that non-consumable waste products of
methamphetamine production should be included—as opposed to the marketoriented approach adopted in some circuits—when determining drug weight
for sentencing purposes.18 Third, this note will challenge the success of United
States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1 (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1) application note 1 in
resolving circuit conﬂicts surrounding this issue and instead argue that application
note 1 directly conﬂicts with congressional intent as interpreted in Chapman.19
Additionally, vague and ambiguous language in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application
note 1 serves as a harbinger of continued confusion.20 Finally, this note will
endorse the plain language approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit in dealing with
by-products of methamphetamine production and determining drug quantity for
sentencing purposes.21

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 453 (holding blotter paper and LSD constitute a “mixture” under
the plain meaning of the term because LSD crystals are diffused among the ﬁbers of the blotter
paper); see infra notes 110–25, 131–33, 136 and accompanying text.
17

See infra notes 110–25, 131–33, 136 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 109–25, 131–33, 137 and accompanying text.

19

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 458–63; see infra notes 126–32, 134–35 and accompanying text.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008) (stating phrases such as,
“if such material cannot readily be separated from the mixture or substance” and “the court may
use any reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be counted”
lead to confusion due, in part, to their ambiguity). It then becomes the responsibility of the court to
determine what can be “easily separated.” Id. Additionally, allowing the courts to “use any reasonable
method” nulliﬁes the purposes of the guidelines: uniformity, honesty, and consistency in sentencing.
Id.
20

21
United States v. Treft, 447 F.3d 421, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding the weight of liquid
containing trace amounts of methamphetamine could be considered for sentencing purposes);
Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1152; United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1509 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“[The] consideration of the total weight of a substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine is proper in determining the defendant’s sentence.”).
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BACKGROUND
Legislative History of 21 U.S.C. § 841
The legislative history behind the issue of whether it is proper to include
by-products of methamphetamine production in determining the drug quantity
for sentencing purposes began with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA).22 Congress constructed
the CDAPCA to combat the growing drug abuse problem in the United States.23
In 1984 Congress amended the CDAPCA with the passage of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA).24 The two most relevant provisions of the
CCCA are Chapter V, titled the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments
Act of 1984 (CSPAA), and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).25 The
CSPAA made “punishment dependent upon the quantity of the controlled
substance involved.”26 The CSPAA also removed, for sentencing purposes, the
distinction between narcotic and non-narcotic substances in Schedules I and II.27
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 represented the ﬁrst global attempt by
Congress to enact legislation regarding sentencing criminal offenders within the
federal system.28 The senate report accompanying the SRA expressed Congress’s
desire to eliminate sentencing disparities within the federal system.29 One of the

22
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970).
23
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, pt. 1 (1970). The CDAPCA contained three titles: Title I set
up drug abuse rehabilitation programs; Title II bestowed law enforcement authority upon the
Department of Justice to address problems associated with drug abuse; and Title III dealt with
the exportation and importation of drugs subject to abuse. Id. Title II, titled the Controlled
Substances Act, affected 21 § U.S.C. 841 by classifying drugs into ﬁve different schedules based
on the likelihood of abuse. Id. The law set punishments based on whether a drug was classiﬁed as a
narcotic under the Act. Id. Drug weight, at this point, was irrelevant in determining an offender’s
punishment. Id.
24

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. V, 98 Stat. 1976,
2068 (1984) (codiﬁed as amended in various sections within 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
25

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2068 (1984) (codiﬁed
as amended in various sections within 21 U.S.C. (2006)); see also Comprehensive Crime Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 255 (1983). The purpose of the CSPAA was to
address three major problems arising out of the existing Controlled Substance Act (CSA). S. REP.
NO. 98-225. First, the Senate Report noted that the CSA lacked any consideration as to the amount
of the controlled substance involved in a particular offense, only accounting for the nature of the
drug for sentencing purposes. Id. Second, the Senate report noted that the CSA did not set adequate
ﬁne levels. Id. The last problem mentioned in the Senate Report, lack of uniformity in sentencing
when Schedule I and Schedule II drugs were involved, needed resolution. Id.
26

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 460 (1991).

27

Id. at 460–61.

28

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).

29

S. REP. NO. 98-225.
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primary vehicles Congress created—within the SRA—to meet this goal was the
United States Sentencing Commission.30 The primary purpose of the Sentencing
Commission is to promulgate a set of sentencing guidelines and policy statements
to aid in eliminating sentencing disparity.31
The next piece of legislation aimed at combating the drug problem in the
United States was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA).32 The ADAA
amended the Controlled Substances Act by setting the sentences for drug trafﬁcking
based upon the aggregate quantity of the drug distributed.33 Congress, by setting
the penalties according to the weight of a “mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount” of a controlled substance, adopted an approach designed to
disable all levels of the drug market.34 Within the framework of this approach,
Congress determined the best way to combat drug abuse in the United States
was to punish those “responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities
of drugs.”35 Congress also determined it was vital to target the “managers of
retail level trafﬁc, the person who is ﬁlling the bags of heroin, packaging crack
into vials or wrapping PCP in aluminum foil, and doing so in substantial street
quantities.”36

Chapman v. United States
Congress, in its legislation, never explicitly deﬁned “mixture or substance.”37
As a result, ambiguity regarding what constitutes a “mixture or substance” for
30

Id.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008). Congress
saw a need, in creating the Sentencing Commission, to address a pre-Guidelines sentencing system
where a defendant was subject to an “indeterminate sentence of imprisonment” that could later be
greatly modiﬁed by the parole commission. Id. This practice often led to defendants only serving
approximately one-third of their original sentence imposed by the court. Id. Second, Congress
sought to narrow the wide disparities in sentences imposed “for similar criminal offenses committed
by similar offenders.” Id. Third, “Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.” Id. The
Sentencing Commission, through the authority given it by Congress, addressed each of the three
objectives by producing a Sentencing Guidelines manual that could be used by all of the federal
court system. Id. The inaugural Guidelines were submitted to Congress on April 13, 1987 and took
effect on November 1, 1987. Id. In the Policy Statement created by the Sentencing Commission,
the Commission outlined three objectives that, if met, would serve to fulﬁll the intent of Congress
in enacting the SRA which was to “enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat
crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.” Id.
31

32

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).

33

H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1986).

34

H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 14–15, 18; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).

H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 14; United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1152 (10th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
35

36

H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 14; accord Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461–62; Richards, 87 F.3d at

37

See 21 U.S.C. § 841.

1156.
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purposes of sentencing under § 841(b) continued until the United States Supreme
Court decided Chapman v. United States.38 Prior to Chapman, there were great
disparities in sentencing under § 841(b).39 In Chapman, the Court addressed
whether it is proper to include the weight of blotter paper containing LSD or the
weight of pure LSD alone in determining a defendant’s eligibility for a mandatory
minimum sentence under § 841(b).40 The Court held the phrase “mixture or
substance” must be given its ordinary meaning.41 The Court also held the phrase
“mixture or substance” was not ambiguous and that including the weight of the
blotter paper for sentencing purposes would not lead to an absurd result.42 The
Court noted that Congress did not offer distinctions between the varying types of
mixtures and instead intended the “penalties for drug trafﬁcking to be graduated
according to the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were found—cut
or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or ready for distribution at the
retail level.”43 The Court then concluded by unequivocally stating, “So long as it
contains a detectable amount, the entire mixture or substance is to be weighed
when calculating the sentence.”44

Neal v. United States
In 1996, the Court solidiﬁed its position in Neal v. United States.45 The
defendant in Neal argued the Sentencing Commission’s deﬁnition of “mixture or
substance” should be the controlling deﬁnition when determining drug quantity
for sentencing purposes under § 841(b).46 The Court rejected this argument and
held Chapman’s plain meaning deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” is controlling.47
The Court, in reaching its decision in Neal, afﬁrmed that Chapman set forth
the controlling deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” for sentencing under § 841.48
It is also important to note that the defendant in Neal asserted the Sentencing
Commission’s amended commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 controlled the
mandatory minimum calculation under § 841(b).49 However, the Court rejected
38

Chapman, 500 U.S. 453.

39

Id. at 458–59.

40

Id. at 461–62.

41

Id. at 468.

42

Id. at 454.

43

Id. at 461.

44

Id. at 459.

45

516 U.S. 284 (1996).

46

Id. at 285–87.

Id. at 290; see also Julie S. Thomerson, Drug Sentencing, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 435, 438–39
(1997) (describing the rationale of the Neal Court in afﬁrming the holding in Chapman).
47

48

Id.

49

Id. at 289–90.
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this argument and reiterated its commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis.50 As
such, the Court was bound to follow the deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” as
articulated in Chapman.51

Circuit Split Surrounding Interpretation of Chapman
Following the clearly articulated decisions in Chapman and Neal, the federal
courts nevertheless failed to uniformly determine drug weights for sentencing
purposes.52 This lack of uniformity can be traced to the various courts’
interpretations of Chapman.53 After Chapman, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits held “only usable or consumable mixtures or substances are
included in the drug quantity for sentencing purposes.”54 Throughout this note,
the approach of these circuits will be termed the market-oriented approach.
By contrast, two circuits, the First and Tenth, adopted a two-step approach to
determining whether to include nonmarketable waste products in calculating drug
weight for sentencing purposes.55 First, the sentencing court determines whether
the defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum term of incarceration.56 That
determination is made using the gross weight, including unmarketable material.57
Second, if the defendant is not subject to a mandatory minimum, the sentencing
court determines the guideline offense level by using the net weight, excluding

50

Id. at 290.

51

Id.

52

See infra note 97 and accompanying text.

53

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 453–54 (holding the words “mixture or substance” in § 841 had
to be given their ordinary meaning because Congress did not provide a statutory deﬁnition). The
Court went on to determine the ordinary meaning of “mixture” includes:
[A] portion of matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear
a ﬁxed proportion to one another and that however thoroughly comingled are
regarded as retaining a separate existence. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1449 (1986). A “mixture” may also consist of two substances blended
together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other.
9 Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed. 1989).
Id. at 454; see also infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
54
United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 377–79 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating only usable or
consumable mixtures or substances can be used in determining drug quantity under § 841(b)); accord
United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1195–96 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 975
F.2d 999, 1006–07 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Acosta; 963 F.2d 551, 554–55 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938
F.2d 1231, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 1991).
55

FED. SENT. L. & PRAC. § 2D1.1 (2009 ed.).

56

Id.

57

Id.
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unmarketable waste material.58 Because the case at hand deals with § 841(b), only
the ﬁrst step in this process will be examined in this note. The Fifth and Eighth
Circuits also include any detectable waste products pursuant to the plain language
of § 841(b).59 For the purposes of this note, the approach taken by the First, Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits will be designated as the plain language approach. As
the various circuit splits show, the issue of what to include when determining
drug quantity for sentencing purposes remains.60 This was the primary issue at
hand when the Tenth Circuit ruled, en banc, in United States v. Richards.61

PRINCIPAL CASE
United States District Court for the District of Utah
On August 10, 1990, law enforcement arrested Larry D. Richards for possession
of a liquid mixture containing detectible amounts of methamphetamine.62 Law
enforcement seized the 32 kilogram solution before Richards could separate the
28 grams of pure methamphetamine suspended in the liquid.63
Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time, the
United States District Court for the District of Utah sentenced Richards to 188
months of imprisonment.64 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which then called for
the use of the entire mixture as part of the calculation, the court calculated the
sentence using the entire 32 kilogram mixture rather than the amount of pure
methamphetamine it contained.65 Richards did not appeal his sentence.66 Instead,

58

Id. (illustrating the second step is only to be used when a defendant is not subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence); see Brief of Appellant at 25–26, United States v. French, 200 Fed.
App’x 774 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5168), 2005 WL 3657815 (distinguishing the holding in
Richards because French was charged under a statute lacking a mandatory minimum).
59
21 U.S.C. § 841(b); United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 954–56 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Treft, 447 F.3d 421, 422 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1023
(8th Cir. 2003).
60
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Clarke v. United States, No. 09-455, 2009 WL
3341929 (Oct. 14, 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-455, 2009 WL 3344912 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009).
61

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.

62

United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1153 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

63

Id.

Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1990). At the time of Richards’s
sentencing, the Guidelines were mandatory. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005).
In 2005, the Supreme Court determined the guidelines violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to have a jury determine the facts which lead to a greater sentence. Id. In doing so, the Court
rendered the guidelines effectively advisory. Id.
64

65

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.

66

Id.
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he ﬁled a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.67 The
court denied that motion.68 Richards ﬁled a second § 2255 motion arguing the
court misapplied the Guidelines when it sentenced him according to the entire
weight of the liquid and not merely the 28 grams of pure methamphetamine.69
The district court granted this motion and ordered Richards’s sentence vacated.70

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Panel Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court and ruled granting the motion to be an abuse of the writ.71 However, the
court noted a pending Sentencing Commission amendment to the commentary
to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 could afford Richards relief if adopted and applied
retroactively.72 The amendment proposed to exclude waste materials requiring
separation from the pure drug prior to use from the drug weight calculation
required under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.73 The amended commentary took effect
November 1, 1993.74 The Sentencing Commission designated the amendment
for retroactive effect.75
67

Id. at 1153; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). A writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides a
prisoner in custody with the ability to move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence if the sentence was in violation of the Constitution, in violation of the
laws of the United States, the sentence was in excess of what was permissible by the law, or the court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
68

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. (stating Richards’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is an abuse of the writ).

72

Id. Congress gave the Sentencing Commission authority to set its own effectiveness dates:
The Commission . . . may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section and
submit to Congress amendments to the guidelines and modiﬁcations to previously
submitted amendments that have not taken effect, including modiﬁcations to the
effective dates of such amendments.

28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
73

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1154. Speciﬁcally, the amendment provides:
“Mixture or substance” as used in this guideline has the same meaning as
in 21 U.S.C. § 841, except as expressly provided. Mixture or substance does not
include materials that must be separated from the controlled substance before the
controlled substance can be used. Examples of such materials include the ﬁberglass
in a cocaine/ﬁberglass bonded suitcase, beeswax in a cocaine/beeswax statue, and
waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance.
If such material cannot be readily be separated from the mixture or substance
that is appropriately counted in the Drug Quantity table, the court may use any
reasonable method to approximate the weight of the mixture or substance to be
counted.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008).
74

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C.

75

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153. Congress gave the Sentencing Commission authority to make its
amendments retroactive by providing:
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Based on the amended commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Richards sought a
reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).76 Richards asserted
the amended commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 required the court to exclude
the liquid by-products seized by law enforcement and recalculate his sentence
based only upon the 28 grams of pure methamphetamine.77 Richards conceded
the mandatory minimum under § 841(b) still applied.78 The government
challenged the reduction, asserting the amended commentary failed to alter the
deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” in § 841, which set the statutory penalties for
methamphetamine trafﬁcking.79 Based on this theory of statutory construction,
the government argued Richards’s sentence should be no less than 120 months.80
The district court reduced Richards’s sentence to sixty months, concluding
§ 841 and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 should be subject to a congruent interpretation in
order to avoid inconsistent results.81 Thus, the district court interpreted § 841’s
phrase “mixture or substance” consistent with the amended Guidelines deﬁnition
and sentenced Richards based on 28 grams of methamphetamine, instead of 32
kilograms of a mixture containing methamphetamine.82
If the Commission reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the
guidelines applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall specify
in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving
terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced.
28 U.S.C. § 994(u); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 (stating a reduction
in term of imprisonment as a result of an amended guideline range occurs in cases “in which a
defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant
has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines”).
76
Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153–54; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). A court may
modify a term of imprisonment “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission.” § 3582(c)(2).
77

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1154.

78

Id. The mandatory minimums for methamphetamine apply as follows:
50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its
isomers or 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine . . . such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death
or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall not be less than
20 years or more than life.

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2006).
79

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1154.

80

Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).

81

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153–54.

82

Richards v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1456, 1461–62 (D. Utah 1992) (holding a sentence
for possession of controlled substance should have been based on actual detectable amount of
methamphetamine and any standard carrier medium, and not on entire weight of mixture where
mixture contained unusable, uningestible, or poisonous materials that rendered the mixture
unmarketable).
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A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
agreed, refusing to sentence Richards based upon the entire 32 kilogram solution.83
The panel reasoned that sentencing Richards according to the 32 kilogram solution
would contradict congressional intent by ignoring the panel’s interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s holding in Chapman v. United States.84 The divided panel
interpreted Chapman as holding “Congress’s ‘market-oriented’ approach dictates
that we not treat unusable drug mixtures as if they were usable.”85

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Rehearing En Banc
Majority Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted en banc
review in order to determine whether the Guideline or statutory deﬁnition of
“mixture or substance” controlled.86 The Richards court, after hearing arguments
from both parties, deemed it necessary to interpret the phrase “mixture or
substance” as found in § 841.87 The court recognized that while Congress left
“mixture or substance” undeﬁned, the court was bound to the interpretation
articulated in Chapman.88 The Chapman Court concluded the phrase “mixture or
substance” must be given its plain and ordinary meaning because Congress was
silent regarding the deﬁnition.89
Richards argued the Tenth Circuit should follow the reasoning of the Second,
Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.90 These circuits—centered on
a market-oriented approach—hold that only usable and marketable materials
should be used when calculating drug quantity for sentencing purposes under
§ 841(b). The Tenth Circuit rejected Richards’s argument based on its holding that
Chapman’s deﬁnition of what constitutes a “mixture or substance” is controlling.91
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit refused to adopt the version of the market-oriented
approach Richards advocated because it disregards the congressional intent to
target offenders involved in the large-scale manufacturing and trafﬁcking of
methamphetamine.92
83

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153–54.

84

Id.; see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 453 (1991) (holding blotter paper and
LSD constitute a “mixture” under the plain meaning of the term because LSD crystals are diffused
among the ﬁbers of the blotter paper).
85

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1153–54; see Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 453.

86

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1154. Circuit Judge Baldock wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 1152.

87

Id. at 1154

88

Id. at 1155.

89

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461–62.

90

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1154–55.

91

Id. at 1157–58.

92

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 14

350

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

The Tenth Circuit held that any substance chemically bonded to the pure
drug should be included in the base sentencing weight.93 The majority rejected
the market-oriented approach by stating that a “detectable amount”—as opposed
to an ingestible or marketable amount—is the nexus of what constitutes a
“mixture or substance.”94 The court noted that the plain language of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), indicating that a “mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine,” was incongruent with the amended
commentary adopted by the Commission in its 1993 amendment to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1.95 The nexus of the incongruence is the word “detectable” as noted in
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and the explicit statement of the Commission—“mixture or
substance does not include materials that must be separated from the controlled
substance before the substance can be used. Examples of such materials include
. . . waste water from an illicit laboratory used to manufacture a substance.”96
As a result of this incongruence, the issue of whether to include waste water for
purposes of calculating drug weight varies throughout the federal court system.97
The Richards court also held that applying the plain meaning of “mixture or
substance” would mean liquid by-products containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine constitute a “mixture or substance” when determining drug
quantity for sentencing purposes under § 841.98 Following this line of reasoning,
the en banc court held Richards responsible for the entire 32 kilogram mixture,
thus putting him in violation of § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and subjecting him to a
mandatory minimum prison sentence of ten years.99

93

Id. at 1157.

94

Id.

95

Id. (emphasis added).

96

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1.

97

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1152–54. The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits do
not count waste water or liquid by-products of drug production when determining drug quantity
for purposes of sentencing under 21 U.S.C § 841(b). E.g., United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192,
1196–97 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1006–07 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d
129, 136–37 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1237–38 (11th Cir.
1991). The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold it proper to include waste water or liquid
by-products of drug production when determining drug quantity for purposes of sentencing under
21 U.S.C § 841(b). E.g., United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d 1501, 1510–11 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409,
412–13 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Beltran-Felix, 934 F.2d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991).
98

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1157–58.

99

Id.
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Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit noted neither § 841 nor its legislative history
mentions the words “marketable,” “usable,” or “consumable.”100 Therefore, the
Richards court held the phrase “detectable amount”—not “usable,” “consumable,”
or “marketable”—is the hallmark of the phrase “mixture or substance” under
§ 841(b).101

Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion in Richards expressed four primary objections.
First, the dissent opined the majority’s interpretation of the plain language of
§ 841 will lead to a result that is “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
the statute’s drafters.”102 Second, the dissent concurred with other circuits by
holding Congress intended the phrase “mixture or substance” in § 841(b) to refer
to a marketable or usable mixture.103 Third, the dissent believed that while the
majority was correct in holding Chapman was controlling precedent in the case at
hand, the dissent believed the majority “divorced the holding in Chapman from its
underlying circumstances and rationale.”104 Finally, the dissent asserted Congress
designed the Sentencing Commission to create and promulgate sentencing policy
and practices for the federal system, and the amended commentary to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1 unambiguously excluded the weight of waste water from the
measurement of a “mixture or substance.”105 Along these lines, the dissent noted
that unnecessary conﬂict and confusion would result from the adoption of any
interpretation contrary to that of the Sentencing Commission.106

ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied the correct
reasoning in United States v. Richards and reached the correct conclusion regarding
the proper determination of methamphetamine drug weight for sentencing
purposes. First, the court properly rejected Richards’s reliance on the marketoriented approach of the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.107

100

Id. at 1158.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 1158–59 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 242 (1989)). Chief Judge Seymour’s dissenting opinion was joined by Circuit Judges
Porﬁlio and Henry. Id. at 1158.
103

Id. at 1158–59; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.

104

Richards, 87 F.3d at 1158–59.

105

Id. at 1160.

106

Id.

107

See infra notes 109–25, 131, 132–33, 137 and accompanying text.
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Second, the court correctly held Chapman’s plain meaning interpretation of
“mixture or substance” controls and is congruent with congressional intent.108
Finally, the court correctly rejected Richards’s assertion that § 841 should be
deﬁned in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 1.109
In contrast to the holding of the court in Richards, the Second, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits adhere to a much different version of the
market-oriented approach.110 Under the approach adopted by these circuits “only
usable or consumable mixtures or substances are included in the drug quantity
for sentencing purposes.”111 Under this approach to sentencing defendants under
§ 841, many offenders involved in large-scale methamphetamine production will
not be punished in accordance with Congressional intent.112
The legislative history for § 841(b) illustrates Congress intended to punish
drug trafﬁckers through the plain language approach adopted by the First, Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.113 The Court remarked that Congress constructed
§ 841(b) in a manner that would penalize drug offenders based on the weight
of the “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of the drugs.114
Congress, in enacting § 841, desired to combat the drug problem in the United
States by targeting both the major trafﬁckers and those participating in the drug
market on the retail or manufacturing level.115
In light of Congress’s desire to disable both the major trafﬁckers and those
involved on retail or manufacturing levels, it is necessary to consider the role
liquid by-products play in the production and distribution of methamphetamine.

108

See infra notes 110–25, 130–32, 136 and accompanying text.

109

See infra notes 126–32, 134–35 and accompanying text.

110

United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d 1152, 1152–53 (1996) (en banc); see supra note 97 and
accompanying text (identifying circuits excluding by-products of methamphetamine production for
sentencing purposes).
111

United States v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 2004).

Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 14 (1986) (asserting law enforcement ought to focus
efforts on disabling “major trafﬁckers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations, who are
responsible for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs”).
112

113

Id. (“[Q]uantities . . . of mixtures, compounds, or preparations that contain a detectable
amount of the drug—these are not necessarily quantities of pure substance.”) (emphasis added).
Congress’s utilization of the word “preparation” seems to indicate a desire, with respect to
methamphetamine, to disable those involved in the preparation of the drug. Id. Methamphetamine,
being produced via liquid synthesis, requires major trafﬁckers and producers to mix a variety of
chemicals in order to reach a street-market product. Id.
114

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 459 (1991); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006).

115

H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, at 14; see also supra notes 110–11.
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Every major method of producing methamphetamine involves the use of some
type of liquid.116 Therefore, if liquid by-products are excluded when determining
drug quantity for the purposes of sentencing, those offenders who Congress
intended to disable would be given lenient sentences that would not reﬂect
their roles in the drug market.117 Typically, those involved in the manufacture
of methamphetamine do not wish to exclusively create a supply to meet their
personal demand; instead, they are seeking to proﬁt from the promulgation of
the drug.118 Therefore, the plain language of the phrase “mixture or substance,”
as provided in Chapman, should be used when determining whether to include
liquid by-products of methamphetamine production when calculating drug
quantity for sentencing purposes.119
Opponents of the plain language approach argue inclusion of by-products of
methamphetamine production will lead to absurd results.120 Adopting the plain
language meaning of “mixture or substance” would not lead to absurd results—
such as the inclusion of packing agents when determining drug quantity for
sentencing purposes.121 There is a glaring difference between liquid by-products
of methamphetamine production and packing agents such as a plastic container
used to carry marijuana from one place to another.122 Under the deﬁnition of
“mixture or substance,” the liquid by-product containing a “detectable” amount
of methamphetamine should be included when calculating drug quantity for
sentencing purposes due to the nature of the methamphetamine production

116
See United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1245–48 (10th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., United
States. v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 467–71 (6th Cir. 2003).
117
United States v. Kuenstler, 325 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating “market oriented”
analysis supports ﬁnding liquid solutions in clandestine laboratories as constituting a “mixture or
substance” containing methamphetamine). The Kuenstler court further noted “the market for this
type of methamphetamine is based on its manufacture in labs . . . and that process involves creation
of a liquid solution . . . a process that results in a product for distribution.” Id.
118

Id. at 1018, 1023; see also, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 954–56 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Treft, 447 F.3d 421, 422 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Sherrod, 964 F.2d
1501, 1511 (5th Cir. 1992).
119
See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 454 (“Since neither the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines
deﬁne ‘mixture,’ and it has no established common-law meaning, it must be given its ordinary
meaning, which is ‘a portion of matter consisting of two or more components . . . that however
thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate existence’ . . . .”) (citations omitted).
120
United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1993) (providing an example of
an absurd result from following the plain language approach). “[I]magine a marijuana farmer who
harvests his crop, leaving a few traces of the illegal plants on the ground. The farmer then plows his
ﬁeld to prepare for next year’s crop and in so doing mixes the traces of marijuana with the soil.” Id.
121

United States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[U]nlike a mere packing agent like
crème liqueur . . . or cornmeal . . . the entire liquid mixture can be said to facilitate the distribution
of methamphetamine because the methamphetamine could not have been produced without it.”).
122

Id.; see infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
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process.123 However, the plastic container would not be subject to the same
inclusion because the bowl and the marijuana do not “consist of two substances
blended together so that the particles of one are diffused among the particles
of the other.”124 The deﬁnition provided by the Chapman Court for the phrase
“mixture or substance” would prevent such items as the plastic container or a
car used to transport cocaine from being included to determine the weight of a
substance for sentencing purposes.125 This interpretation is in line with both a
plain language interpretation of § 841 and the intent of Congress.126
With the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the
establishment of the Sentencing Commission, Congress created an entity meant
to provide consistency, fairness, and clarity to the federal sentencing process.127 For
the most part, the Sentencing Commission accomplished these goals; however,
in the case of the amended commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the Sentencing
Commission created confusion instead of clarity.128 The Sentencing Commission
stated in application note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 that “‘mixture or substance’
as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U.S.C § 841, except as
expressly provided.”129 The application note expressly states “waste water from an
illicit laboratory used to manufacture a controlled substance” should be excluded
from the deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” under § 841(b).130
The exclusion of waste water from drug quantity calculation is incongruent
with the time-honored practice of statutory construction and illustrates a complete
disregard for the plain language deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” determined
by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman.131 Legislative history reﬂects

123

Innie, 7 F.3d at 847.

124

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 454, 462 (“Using the dictionary deﬁnition would not allow the
clause to be interpreted to include LSD in a bottle or in a car, since, unlike blotter paper, those
containers are easily distinguished and separated from LSD.”).
125

Id.

126

Id.; see supra notes 110–24 and accompanying text.

127

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008).

128

See Matthew Thomas Geiger, Note, Diagram of a Drug Sentence—Deﬁning “Mixture
or Substance” on the Basis of Utility in United States v. Richards, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 119, 131–32
(1998) (noting the amended language in the Guidelines is in direct conﬂict with the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Richards); cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008) (stating
materials that cannot be readily separated should not be included when determining drug quantity
for sentencing purposes).
129

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008).

130

Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).

131

Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462–66.
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the intentions of Congress when dealing with controlled substances that could
be subject to the phrase “mixture or substance.”132 Congress was cognizant of the
nature of drug trafﬁcking and the different methods employed, depending on
what type of drug was being produced.133
The current split among the circuits regarding this issue must be resolved to
provide uniformity and consistency within the federal sentencing system.134 The
disconnect between the Chapman deﬁnition of “mixture or substance” and the
alternative deﬁnition presented in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 1 must be
reconciled.135 Due to the disparate treatment of methamphetamine offenders, the
following steps should be taken. First, the Sentencing Commission should repeal
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 1 and reinstitute the Guideline scheme in
operation prior to 1993.136 Second, Congress should amend 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
to expressly deﬁne what is meant by “mixture or substance.”137 Third, the United
States Supreme Court should grant certiorari the next time a case dealing with the
issue presented in Richards arises.138

CONCLUSION
Given the plain language of § 841, its legislative history, and the substantial
body of case law indicating the necessity of including liquid by-products of
methamphetamine production, the en banc court in Richards correctly held it

132

Id.

133

See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.

134

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Clarke, No. 09-455, 2009 WL 3341929 (Oct. 14,
2009) (asserting the need for the Court to resolve the existing circuit split).
135

See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462; Innie, 7 F.3d at 847 (suggesting the pre-1993 amendment
Guidelines were “consistent with Congress’s directive to impose sentences based on quantity rather
than purity”). The court’s holding in Innie suggests there was uniformity between the pre-1993
amendment Guidelines and the congressional intent behind § 841. Innie, 7 F.3d at 847; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008).
136

See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.

137

Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. 160, 175 (1864) (opining that legislative action to correct
mistakes and provide remedies are peculiar subjects of legislation and lay outside the providence of
the judiciary).
138
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Clarke, No. 09-455, 2009 WL 3341929 (Oct. 14,
2009), cert. denied, 2009 WL 3344912 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009); see also Richards, 87 F.3d 1153, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1003 (1996); Walker, 960 F.2d 409, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 967 (1992); Fowner v.
United States, 947 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 933 (1992). Justice White, in the
Fowner dissent, expressed concern that the issue of whether waste by-products of methamphetamine
production should be included in calculating the weight of a “mixture or substance” for purposes
of sentencing is a recurring one. Fowner, 504 U.S. at 933–35 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
also noted the conﬂict among the circuits: “identical conduct in violation of the same federal laws
may give rise to widely disparate sentences in different areas of the country.” Id.
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proper to include liquid by-products of methamphetamine production when
determining drug quantity for sentencing purposes under § 841.139 First, the
en banc court in Richards correctly held Congress intended to adopt the plain
language approach as interpreted by the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
to drug sentencing as opposed to the market-oriented approach adopted by other
circuits.140 Second, the plain language of § 841 is indicative of Congress’s desire
to include liquid by-products of methamphetamine production for sentencing
purposes.141 Finally, the en banc court in Richards correctly held § 841 should
not be deﬁned in conformity to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application note 1.142 The
split among the various circuits surrounding this issue should compel the United
States Supreme Court to revisit this issue and grant certiorari.143 If certiorari is
not granted, the lack of uniformity will continue to result in disparate sentences
and defendants will not be afforded any degree of certainty when engaged in the
federal criminal justice system.144

139

See supra notes 109–37 and accompanying text.

140

See supra notes 109–25, 131–33, 137 and accompanying text.

141

See supra notes 110–25, 130–32, 136 and accompanying text (arguing it is proper to
include non-ingestible waste products of methamphetamine production when determining drug
quantity for sentencing purposes).
142
See supra notes 126–32, 134–35 and accompanying text (arguing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. n.1 should be revised in accordance with the plain language of
§ 841).
143

See supra notes 3, 7, 133 and accompanying text.

144

See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
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